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Agri-environmental Management during EU Integration of Bulgaria  
 
Hrabrin Bachev1 
  
This paper suggests a holistic framework for analyzing the forms and efficiency of agri-
environmental management; assesses evolution of market, private, public and hybrid modes of agri-
eco-governance during transition and EU integration in Bulgarian; evaluates the impacts of EU CAP on 
environmental sustainability of Bulgarian farms; specifies major environmental challenges in Bulgarian 
agriculture, and suggests recommendations for improvement of public policies for effective 
environmental management. First, it incorporates interdisciplinary New Institutional Economics and 
suggests a comprehensive framework of analyzing the eco-management in agriculture. Second, it 
presents the evolutions of diverse forms of eco-management during post-communist transition and EU 
integration of Bulgarian agriculture, and analyzes their impact(s) on agents’ behaviour and efficiency. 
Third, it assesses the impact(s) of dominating system of management and the new public (EU, 
national) measures on the state of environment, and identifies major eco-challenges, conflicts and 
risks. Forth, it evaluates the impacts of EU CAP implementation on eco-performance of Bulgarian 
farms. Finally, it suggests recommendations for institutional modernization and for improvement of 
public policies for effective environmental management. 
 
Keywords: agri-eco-governance; market, private, public modes; agricultural transition; eco-effects of 
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Introduction  
 
There has been a fundamental transformation of Bulgarian agriculture for the last 20 years 
which has affected profoundly agricultural impact(s) on the environment. With few exceptions 
(Bachev, 2008, 2009, 2012a) there are no publications on modes and efficiency of 
environmental management during transition and EU integration of the country. 
This chapter suggests a holistic framework for analyzing the forms and efficiency of 
environmental management in agriculture; assesses evolution of market, private, and public 
modes during transition and EU integration of Bulgarian agriculture; specifies major 
challenges and suggest recommendations for improvement of public policies for effective 
environmental protection. First, it incorporates the interdisciplinary New Institutional 
Economics and suggests a comprehensive framework of analyzing the eco-management in 
agriculture. Second, it presents evolutions of various market, private, and public forms of eco-
management during post-communist transition and EU integration of Bulgarian agriculture, 
and analyzes their impact(s) on agents’ behaviour and efficiency. Third, it assesses the 
impact(s) of dominating system of management and the new public (EU, national) measures 
on the state of environment, and identifies major eco-challenges, conflicts and risks. Finally, it 
suggests recommendations for institutional modernization, and for improvement of public 
policies for effective environmental protection.  
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1. Framework of analysis of agri-environmental management  
 
Agri-eco-management modes 
 
Environmental management means management of environment preservation and 
improvement activities of individual agents. Maintaining and amelioration of the state of 
natural environment (air, waters, lands, biodiversity, climate) requires an effective social order 
(governance) regulating behaviour and relations of various agents related to environment  - a 
system of motivation and coordination of (eco-)actions which is to induce appropriate 
behaviour2 of individuals and coordinated actions at group, regional, national, and 
transnational levels (Bachev, 2010a).  
Environmental management in agriculture comprises the environmental management 
associated with agricultural (food, fibber, fuel, raw material etc.) production. It (is to) involves 
management of activities, relations, and impacts of diverse agrarian (farm managers, 
resource owners, agricultural labour) and non-agrarian (upstream and down-stream 
businesses, consumers, residents, interest groups) agents (Figure 1).   
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Figure 1. Description and Source: (Eventually) 
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Figure 1. Structure of environmental management in agriculture  
 
In certain cases, eco-management in agriculture is entirely archived through individual 
actions of autonomous agents (farms) within the “Sector Agriculture” (yellow pattern area of 
Figure 1) – e.g. a good care for privately owned agricultural land is typical in a family farm.  
However, the effective environmental management often necessitates concerted 
(collective) actions of a number of farms as it is in the case of sustainable use of a common 
pasture and limited water supply, protection of local biodiversity etc. Furthermore, modern 
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 farming activity is frequently associated with significant (positive and/or negative) externalities 
which require managing relations (cooperation, reconciling conflicts, recovery of costs) 
between different farms, and increasingly between farmers and non-farmers. For example, 
adverse effects of agricultural activities on water and air quality are often felt by residents and 
businesses in neighbourhood or more remote regions. Similarly, agricultural contribution to 
ecosystem services benefits a large number of residents, visitors, consumers, businesses, 
and interest groups requiring certain collective actions for sustainable supply. In all these 
instances, environmental management goes beyond simple (technical, agronomic, ecological) 
“relations with nature” and embraces the governance of relations and collective actions of 
agents with diverse interests, power positions, awareness, capabilities etc. in large 
geographical, sectoral, and temporal scales.  
What is more, modern environmental management is associated with growing needs 
for “additional” actions (monitoring, coordination, investments etc.) and integral management 
of natural resources and eco-risks at national and progressively at transnational scale. The 
later include water and garbage management, biodiversity conservation, climate change etc. 
issues demanding effective regional, nationwide, international, and global governance. For 
instance, the effective management of biodiversity “component” of environment includes 
multilevel (individual, sectoral, national, EU, worldwide) and multilateral initiatives of 
numerous farmers, businesses, consumers, residents, interests groups etc. (area under 
green downward arrows, Figure 1). The same is true for waters, lands, air etc. management. 
Individuals behaviour (actions, restriction of actions) are affected and governed by a 
number of distinct modes and mechanisms of management which include (Figure 2): 
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Figure 2. Modes of environmental management in agriculture  
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Figure 2. Modes of environmental management in agriculture  
 
First, institutional environment (“rules of the game”) - that is the distribution of rights 
between individuals, groups, and generations, and the system(s) of enforcement of these 
rights and rules (Furuboth and Richter; North). The spectrum of rights could embrace material 
assets, natural resources, intangibles, certain activities, clean environment, food security, 
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 intra- and inter-generational justice etc. A part of the rights and rules are constituted by formal 
laws, regulations, standards, court decisions etc. In addition, there are important informal 
rules and rights determined by tradition, culture, religion, ideology, ethical and moral norms. 
Enforcement of rights and rules is done by the state, community pressure, trust, reputation, 
private modes, and self-enforcement. 
Institutions and institutional modernization create dissimilar incentives, restrictions and 
costs for maintaining and improving environment, intensifying eco-exchange and cooperation, 
increasing eco-productivity, inducing private and collective eco-initiatives, developing new 
eco- and related rights, decreasing eco-divergence between social groups and regions, 
responding to ecological and other challenges etc.3  
The institutional “development” is initiated by the public (state, community) authority, 
international actions (agreements, assistance, pressure), and the private and collective 
actions of individuals. It is associated with the modernization and/or redistribution of the 
existing rights; and the evolution of new rights and the emergence of novel (private, public, 
hybrid) institutions for their enforcement. In modern society a great deal of individuals’ 
activities and relations are regulated and sanctioned by some (general, specific) formal and 
informal institutions. However, there is no perfect system of preset outside rules that can 
manage effectively the entire eco-activity of individuals in all possible (and quite specific) 
circumstances of their life and relations associated with the natural environment. 
Second, market modes (“invisible hand of market”) – those are various decentralized 
initiatives governed by free market price movements and market competition – e.g. spotlight 
exchanges, classical contracts, production and trade of organic products and origins etc. 
The importance of free market for the coordination (direction, correction) and 
stimulation of economic activities, exchanges and allocation of resources is among 
fundamentals of the Economic theory. Individual agents use (adapt to) markets profiting from 
the specialization and mutually beneficial exchange (trade) while their voluntary decentralized 
actions govern the overall distribution of efforts and resources between activities, sectors, 
regions, eco-systems, countries etc. Nevertheless, there are many instances of lack of 
individual incentives, choices and/or unwanted exchanges related to conservation of natural 
environment - e.g. missing markets, monopoly and power relations, positive or negative 
externalities etc. Consequently, free market “fails” to manage effectively the entire eco-
activity, exchanges, and investments of individuals. 
Third, private modes (“private or collective order”) – those are diverse private 
initiatives and special contractual and organizational arrangements – e.g. voluntary eco-
actions, codes of eco-behaviour, eco-contracts, eco-cooperatives etc. 
Individual agents take advantage of economic, market, institutional etc. opportunities 
and deal with institutional and market deficiency by selecting or designing mutually beneficial 
private modes (rules) for governing their behaviour, relations and exchanges. The private 
mode negotiates own rules or accepts (imposes) existing private or collective order, transfers 
existing rights or gives new rights to counterpart(s), and safeguards absolute4 and/or 
contracted rights. In modern society a great part of the agrarian activity is managed by 
                                                           
3 Socially and legally acceptable norms for use of labour, plant, livestock, and environmental 
resources; employment of certain forms of contracts or organizations; trade with natural resources and 
products etc., all they could differ even between various regions of the same country.  
4 assigned by the dominating institutions. 
 voluntary initiatives, private negotiations, “visible hand of the manager”, or collective decision-
making. Nevertheless, there are many examples of private sector deficiency in governing of 
socially desirable activity such as environmental preservation, eco-system services etc. 
Forth, public modes (“public order”) – these are various forms of public (community, 
government, international) intervention in market and private sectors - e.g. public guidance, 
regulation, taxation, assistance, funding, provision, property right modernization etc. 
The role of public (local, national, and transnational) governance has been increasing 
along with the intensification of activity and exchange, and growing interdependence of socio-
economic and environmental activities. In many cases, effective management of individual 
behaviour and/or organization of certain activity through a market mechanism and/or a private 
negotiation would take a long period of time, be very costly, could not reach a socially 
desirable scale, or be impossible at all. Thus a centralized public intervention could achieve 
the willing state faster, cheaper or more efficiently. Nonetheless, there are a great number of 
bad public involvements (inaction, wrong intervention, over-regulation) leading to significant 
problems of sustainable development around the globe (Bachev, 2010b). 
Fifth, hybrid forms – some combination of the above three modes. 
The efficiency of individual management modes is quite different since they have 
unlike potential to: induce eco-friendly behaviour, reconcile eco-conflicts and coordinate eco-
actions of different parties, impact environmental sustainability and mitigate eco-risks, and 
minimize the overall environment management (conservation, third-party, transaction) costs, 
for agents with different preferences and capability, and in the specific (socio-economic, 
natural) conditions of each eco-system, community, industry, region, and country. For 
instance, appropriate information would be enough to induce voluntary actions by a “green” 
farmer, while most commercial enterprises would need outside incentives (price premium, 
compensation, punishment); market prices would usually coordinate well relations between 
water suppliers and users, while regulation of relations of water polluters and users would 
require a special private or public order, etc. 
 “Governance matters” and depending on the (efficiency of) system of management 
“put in place” the individual communities and societies achieve quite dissimilar results in eco-
conservation. Consequently, the type of exploitation of natural resources by agriculture and 
the agricultural impact on environment would differ quite substantially in different stages of 
development and among diverse farming structures, eco-systems, regions, and countries. 
 
Stages of agri-eco-management analysis and improvement  
 
Analysis and improvement of environmental management involves following stages: 
First, trends, factors, problems, and risks associated with natural environment and its 
individual elements (land, water, air, biodiversity, eco-systems, climate etc.) are to be 
identified (Figure 3). The modern science offers quite precise methods to assess the state of 
environment, and detect existing, emerging and likely challenges - environmental changes, 
degradations, destructions, and risks (MEA). What is more, it offers reliable instruments to 
estimate agricultural contribution to and impact on the state (“health”) of environment and its 
different components, including in different spatial and temporal scales. 
In any case, persistence of serious eco-problems and risks is an indicator that an 
effective system of eco-management is not put in place (Bachev and Nanseki). 
 
  
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
Figure 3. Stages in analysis and improvement of eco-management in agriculture  
 
Second, assessment is to be made on efficiency and potential of available and other 
feasible modes and mechanisms of management (institutions, market, private, public, hybrid) 
to deal with existing, emerging and likely eco-problems and risks associated with agriculture.  
Analysis is to embrace all forms of management related to eco-management - formal, 
informal, market, contract, internal, individual, collective, public, specialized, multifunctional, 
simple, complex, etc. In fact most analyses are restricted to a certain form (formal, farm, 
cooperative, public program) ignoring other important, dependent, or complementary modes.  
Efficiency of individual modes are to be evaluated in terms of their potential to induce 
eco-friendly behaviour and cooperation, detect eco-problems and risks, reconcile eco-
conflicts, stimulate eco-activity and protect eco-investment, save overall environmental 
(conservation, recovery, enhancement, transaction etc.) costs, and contribute to sustainable 
exploitation of environmental resources. Furthermore, efficiency of individual forms can not be 
fully understood without analyzing the complementarities between different forms – e.g. a 
high complementarities between family farms and farm cooperatives for certain activities. 
Most assessments include only direct, production (eco-recovery, eco-maintenance, 
eco-enhancement), or program (international assistance, taxpayer) costs. Analysis is to 
include all (social) costs associated with different forms of eco-management – private, third-
party, public, current, long-term, production, transaction etc. In addition to proper individual 
and third-party production (technological, agronomic, ecological etc.) costs, the eco-
management is usually associated with significant transaction (governance) costs. The later 
could be defined as costs for protection, contracting and exchange of individual rights or costs 
for governing relations with other agents - individuals, private entities, public authorities 
(Bachev, 2010b). 
Usually assessments are limited to absolute efficiency of individual forms of eco-
management (related costs, environmental effects) ignoring their comparative efficiencies. 
The analysis is to incorporate both absolute and comparative (in relation to other feasible 
 modes) efficiency of diverse management modes. For instance, often dominating public 
organisations “work well” but they are less efficient (in terms of incentives, overall costs, 
adaptation and investment potential) in comparison to private, market or hybrid (public-private 
partnership) structures. 
Comprehensive analysis let determine deficiencies (“failures”) in dominating market, 
private, and public modes to manage effectively existing, emerging and likely eco-problems 
and risks, and specify the needs for (new) public intervention in agrarian eco-management. 
Third, alternative and practically possible modes for new public intervention able to 
correct market, private and public failures are to be identified, their comparative efficiency 
assessed, and the most efficient one(s) selected. Only technically, economically, and 
politically feasible modes of new public intervention in environmental management are to be 
specified. Their comparative (goal achieving, coordinating, stimulating, costs-minimizing) 
efficiency to and complementarities with other practically possible modes of public 
involvement (assistance, public-private partnership, property rights modernization etc.) is to 
be assessed, and the best one(s) introduced.  
Suggested analysis is to be made at different levels (farm, eco-system, regional, 
sectors, national, international) according to the type of eco-challenges and scales of 
collective actions necessary to mitigate specific eco-problems and risks. It is not a one time 
exercise completing in the last stage with a perfect system of eco-management. It is rather a 
permanent process which is to improve eco-management along with the evolution of natural 
environment, individual and communities’ awareness, and modernisation of technologies and 
institutional environment. Besides, public (local, national, international) failure is also possible 
which brings us into the next cycle in improvement of eco-management in agriculture. 
 
Factors of agri-eco-management choice  
 
Most environmental activity and exchange in agriculture could be managed through a 
great variety of alterative forms. For instance, a supply of environmental preservation service 
could be governed as: voluntary activity of a farmer; though private contracts of the farmer 
with interested or affected agents; though interlinked contract between the farmer and a 
supplier or processor; though cooperation (collective action) with other farmers and 
stakeholders; though (free) market or assisted by a third-party (certifying and controlling 
agent) trade with special (eco, protected origins, fair-trade) products; though a public contract 
specifying farmer’s obligations and compensation; though a public order (regulation, taxation, 
quota for use of resources/emissions); within a hierarchical public agency or by a hybrid form. 
Commonly natural and institutional environment evolve very slowly over a long-term 
periods. Therefore, in the specific natural, socio-economic and institutional environment, the 
choice of management mode would depend on a number of key factors including (Figure 4): 
- personal characteristics of individual agents – preferences, believes, ideology, 
knowledge, capability, training, managerial experience, risk-aversion, bounded rationality, 
tendency for opportunism, reputation, trust, power etc. For instance, benefits for farmers from 
eco-management could range from monetary or non-monetary income; profit; indirect 
revenue; to pleasure of involvement in environment and biodiversity preservation activity. 
- formal and informal institutions - often the choice of management mode is 
(pre)determined by the institutional restrictions as some forms for carrying out farming, 
 environmental etc. activities could be socially unacceptable or illegal5. For instance, market 
trade of farmland, natural resources, and (some) eco-system services are not allowed.  
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
Figure 4. Factors for eco-management choice in agriculture 
 
Furthermore, institutional environment considerably affects the level of management 
costs and thus the choice of one or another form of organization. For instance, in conditions 
of well-working public system of regulations (quality standards, guarantees) and laws and 
contract enforcement, a preference is given to spotlight and classical (standard) contracts. On 
the other hand, when rights on major agrarian and natural resources are not defined or not 
well defined, and absolute and contracted right effectively enforced, then high transaction 
costs could create difficulties (block) effective eco-management - costly unsolvable disputes 
between polluting and affected agents, disregards of interests of certain groups or 
generations etc. Consequently, the institutional structures for carrying out agrarian and 
environmental activities become an important factor, which eventually determines the 
outcome of the system (efficiency) and the type of development (sustainability). 
- natural and technological factors - eco-management strongly depends on the type of 
environmental challenge (spatial and temporal scale, risks etc.) and natural recourses 
endowment as well as on the development of farming, environmental, monitoring, information 
etc. technologies. For instance, management of water resources depends on the 
advancement of water conservation, use, recycling and monitoring technologies etc. 
Different management modes are alternative but not equally efficient modes for the 
organization of eco-activities. Each form has distinct advantages and disadvantages to 
protect eco-rights and investment, coordinate and stimulate socially desirable eco-behaviour 
and activities, explore economies of scale and scope, save production and transaction costs. 
Therefore, available forms are to be assessed in terms of the absolute and the comparative 
                                                           
5 When costs of illegitimate forms are not high (possibility for disclosure low, enforcement and 
punishment insignificant) while benefits considerable, then more effective gray or black modes prevail. 
 potential (limits) of protect eco-rights and investments of agents, assure socially desirable 
level of environmental conservation (enhancement), minimize overall costs, coordinate and 
stimulate eco-activities, reconcile conflicts, and recover long-term costs for organizational 
development in the specific economic, institutional and natural environment.  
Free market has a big coordination and incentive advantages (“invisible hand”, “power 
of competition”), and provides “unlimited” opportunities to benefit from specialization and 
exchange. However, market management could be associated with a high uncertainty, risk, 
and costs due to low appropriability of some rights (“public good” character), price instability, 
a great possibility for facing an opportunistic behaviour, “missing market” situation etc.  
Special contract form (“private ordering”) permits a better coordination and 
intensification of activity, and safeguard of agent’s rights and investments. However, it may 
require large costs for specification (and writing) contract provisions, adjustments with 
constant changes in conditions, enforcement and disputing of negotiated terms etc.  
Internal organization allows a greater flexibility and control on activity (direct 
coordination, adaptation, enforcement, and dispute resolution by a fiat). However, extension 
of internal mode beyond family and small-partnership boundaries (allowing achievement of 
minimum technological or ecological requirements; exploration of technological economies of 
scale and scope) may command significant costs for development (initiation, design, formal 
registration, restructuring), and for current management (collective decision making, control 
on coalition members opportunism, supervision and motivation of hired labour).  
Separation of the ownership from the management (cooperative, corporation, public 
farm/firm) gives enormous opportunities for growth in productivity and management efficiency 
– internal division and specialization of labour; achieving ecosystem’s requirements; 
exploration of economies of scale and scope; introduction of innovation; diversification; risk 
sharing; investing in product promotion, brand names, relations with customers, counterparts 
and authorities. However, it could be connected with huge transaction costs for decreasing 
information asymmetry between management and shareholders, decision-making, controlling 
opportunism, adaptation etc. The cooperative and non-for profit form also suffers from a low 
capability for internal long-term investment due to non-for-profit goals and non-tradable 
character of shares (so called “horizon problem”). 
If transaction costs were zero, then the mode of management would have no 
economic importance (Coase; Williamson). Individuals would manage their relationships with 
the same (equal) efficiency though: free market (adapting to price movements), and private 
modes of different types (contracts, firms), and collective decision making (cooperative, 
association), and in a nationwide hierarchy (a single private or state company). Then 
ecological requirements and technological opportunities for economies of scale and scope 
(the maximum environmental enhancement and productivity of resources, “internalization of 
externalities”) would be easily achieved (Coase). All information for the effective potential of 
activity and exchange (optimization of resources, meeting various demands, respecting 
assigned and transferred rights) would be costlessly available to everybody, and individuals 
would costlessly define new rights, and protect their (absolute and contracted) rights, and 
trade owned resources (and products) in mutual benefit until exhausting the possibilities for 
increasing productivity and environmental conservation (improvement). 
 However, environmental management is usually associated with considerable 
transaction costs6. For example, agents have costs for identification and protection of various 
rights; complying with diverse institutional restrictions (norms, standards, rules); finding best 
partners and prices; negotiating conditions of exchange; contract writing and registration; 
enforcing negotiated terms through monitoring, controlling, measuring and safeguarding; 
disputing through a court system or another way; adjusting or termination along with evolving 
conditions of exchange etc.  
Assessment of the precise levels of transaction costs in eco-activity is often impossible 
or very expensive (Bachev, 2009). That is why the analysis is to focus on the combination of 
critical dimensions of eco-activity and transaction7 - the factors responsible to the variation of 
transacting costs between alternative modes of management (Figure 5).  
Eco-activity and transactions with good appropriability of rights, high certainty, and 
universal character of investments could be effectively managed by free market through 
spotlight or classical contracts. For instance, there are widespread market modes for selling 
diverse ecosystem services and eco-products - eco-visits, organic, fair-trade, origins, self-
pick, eco-education, eco-tourism, eco-restaurants etc. 
 
Critical dimensions of transactions 
                        Appropriability 
                               High Low 
           Assets Specificity 
      Low      High 
                Uncertainty 
       Low       High       Low      High 
                  Frequency 
 
 
 
Generic modes 
High  Low High  Low High  Low High  Low 
 
Free market          
Special contract form          
Internal organization          
Third-party involvement          
Public intervention          
 - the most effective mode;  - necessity for a third party involvement 
Figure 5. Principle modes for environmental management in agriculture 
Transactions with low specificity and high appropriability could be effectively managed 
through a special contract. For example, eco-contracts and cooperative agreements between 
farmers and interested businesses or communities are widely used including a payment for 
ecosystem services, and leading to production methods (enhanced pasture management, 
reduced use of agrochemicals, wetland preservation etc.) protecting water from pollution, 
mitigating floods and wild fires etc.  
                                                           
6 Transaction costs have two behaviour origin – agents bounded rationality and tendency for 
opportunism (Williamson). 
7 Frequency, uncertainty”, and asset specificity are identified as critical factors of transaction costs by 
Williamson (Williamson) while appropriability added by Bachev and Labonne (Bachev and Labonne). 
 Transactions and activity with high frequency, big uncertainty, great assets specificity, 
and high appropriability, have to be managed within internal organization. Very often the 
effective scale of specific investment in eco-management (minimum required for eco-impact, 
exploring economies of scale and scope) exceeds borders of traditional agrarian 
organizations (family farm, small partnership). If specific capital (knowledge, technology, 
equipment, funding) cannot be effectively organized within a singe organization8, then 
effective external form(s) is to be used – e.g. joint ownership, interlinks, cooperative, lobbying 
for public intervention. For instance, environmental cooperatives are very successful in some 
European countries. Nevertheless, costs for initiation and maintaining collective organization 
for overcoming unilateral dependency are usually great (big number of coalition, different 
interests of members, opportunism of “free-riding” type) and it is unsustainable or does not 
evolve at all.  
Transaction costs analysis let us identify situations of market and private sector 
failures. For instance, serious problems usually arise when condition of assets specificity is 
combined with high uncertainty and low frequency, and when appropriability is low. In all 
these cases, a third part (private agent, NGO, public authority) involvement in transactions is 
necessary (through assistance, arbitration, regulation) in order to make them more efficient or 
possible at all. Emergence and unprecedented development of special origins, organic 
farming and system of fair-trade, are good examples in that respect. There is increasing 
consumer’s demand (price premium) for these products but their supply could not be met 
unless effective trilateral management (including independent certification and control) is put 
in place. 
Respecting others rights or granting out additional rights could be managed by “good 
will” or charity actions. For instance, a great number of voluntary environmental initiatives 
(“codes of behaviour”) have emerged driven by farmers’ preferences for eco-production, 
competition in industries, and responds to public pressure for a sound environmental 
management. However, voluntary and charity initiatives could hardly satisfy the entire social 
demand especially if they require considerable costs. Besides, environmental standards are 
usually “process-based”, and “environmental audit” is not conducted by independent party, 
which does not guarantee a “performance outcome”. 
Most environmental management requires large organizations with diversified 
interests of agents (providers, consumers, destructors, interest groups etc.). Emergence of 
special large-members organizations for dealing with low appropriability is slow and 
expensive, and they are not sustainable in long run (“free riding” problem). Therefore, there is 
a strong need for a third-party public (Government, local authority, international assistance) 
intervention to make such eco-activity possible or more effective (Bachev 2009, 2012b). 
 
Public modes of agri-eco-management  
 
The overall (public and private) implementation and transaction costs of public modes 
of eco-management are to be taken into account. The later would depend on uncertainty, 
frequency, and necessity for specific investment of public involvement (Figure 6).  
Interventions with a low uncertainty and assets specificity would normally require a 
smaller public organization - more regulatory modes, improvement of the general laws and 
                                                           
8 coalition made, minimum scale of operations reached, economy of scale and scope explored. 
 contract enforcement etc. When uncertainty and assets specificity of transactions increases a 
special contract mode would be necessary – e.g. employment of public contracts for provision 
of private services, public funding (subsidies) of private activities, temporary labour contract 
for carrying out special public programs, leasing out public assets for private management 
etc. And when transactions are characterized with high assets specificity, uncertainty and 
frequency, then an internal mode and a bigger public organization would be necessary – e.g. 
permanent public employment contracts, in-house integration of crucial assets in a 
specialized state agency or public company etc.  
 
Level of Uncertainty, Frequency, and Assets specificity 
 Low                                            ←-----------------------------------→                                           High 
New property 
rights and 
enforcements 
Public 
regulations 
Public 
taxation 
Public 
assistance 
Public 
funding 
Public 
provision 
Figure 6. Principle modes for public intervention in environmental management 
Initially, existing and emerging problems (difficulties, costs, risks, failures) in the 
organization of market and private transactions are specified (Figure 5). The appropriate 
pubic involvement would be to create an environment for: decreasing uncertainty surrounding 
market and private transactions, increasing intensity of exchange, protecting private rights 
and investments, and making private investments less dependent. For instance, State 
establishes and enforces quality, safety and eco-standards for farm inputs and produces, 
certifies producers and users of natural resources, transfers water management rights to 
farms associations, sets up minimum farm-gate prices etc. All these facilitate and intensify 
(market and private) transactions and increase efficiency of economic organizations.   
Next, practically possible modes for increasing appropriability of activity (transactions) 
have to be considered. The low appropriability is often caused by unspecified or badly 
specified private rights (Bachev, 2004). In some cases, the most effective government 
intervention would be to introduce and enforce new private property rights – e.g. rights on 
natural, biological, and environmental resources; rights on issuing and trading eco-bonds and 
shares; tradable quotas for polluting; private rights on intellectual agrarian property and 
origins etc. That would be efficient when privatization of resources or the introduction and 
enforcement of new rights is not associated with significant costs (uncertainty, recurrence, 
and level of specific investment are low).  
That public intervention effectively transfers the organization of transactions into the 
market and private management, liberalizes market competition and induces private 
incentives (and investments) in certain activities. For instance, tradable permits (quotas) are 
used to control the overall use of certain resources or level of a particular type of pollution. 
They give flexibility allowing farmers to trade permits and meet their own requirements 
according to their adjustment costs and specific conditions of production. That form is efficient 
when a particular target must be met, and the progressive reduction is dictated through 
 permits while trading allows the compliance to be achieved at least costs (through a private 
management). The later let also a market for environmental quality to develop9.  
In other instances, it would be efficient to put in place regulations for trade and 
utilization of resources and products – e.g. standards for labour safety, product quality, 
environmental performance, animal welfare; norms for using natural resources, introduction of 
foreign species and GM crops, and (water, soil, air, comfort) contamination; a ban on 
application of certain chemicals or technologies; regulations for trading ecosystem service 
protection; foreign trade regimes; mandatory eco-training and licensing of farm operators etc.  
The large body of environmental regulations in developed countries aim changing the 
farmers behaviour and restricting the negative impact on environment. It makes producers 
responsible for the environmental effects (externalities) of their products or the management 
of products uses (e.g. waste). This mode is effective when a general improvement of the 
performance is desired but it is not possible to dictate what changes (in activities, 
technologies) is appropriate for a wide range of operators and environmental conditions (high 
uncertainty and information asymmetry). When the level of hazard is high, the outcome is 
certain and the control is easy, and no flexibility exists (for timing or the nature of socially 
required result), then the bans or strict limits are the best solution. However, the regulations 
impose uniform standards for all regardless of the costs for compliance (adjustment) and give 
no incentives to over-perform beyond a certain level.  
In other instances, using the incentives and restrictions of tax system would be the 
most effective form for public intervention. Different sorts of tax preferences (exception, 
breaks, credits) are widely used to create favourable conditions for certain (sub)sectors and 
regions, forms of agrarian organization, or specific types of activities. The environmental 
taxation on emissions or products (inputs or outputs of production) is also applied to reduce 
the use of harmful substances. The later impose the same conditions for all farmers using a 
particular input and give signals to take into account the “environmental costs” inflicted on the 
rest of society. Taxing is effective when there is a close link between the activity and the 
environmental impact, and when there is no immediate need to control the pollution or to 
meet the targets for reduction. However, an appropriate level of the charge is required to 
stimulate a desirable change in farmers’ behaviour. Furthermore, some emissions vary 
according to the conditions of application and attempting to reflect this in tax system often 
result in complexity and high administrating costs.  
In some cases, a public assistance and support to private organizations is the best 
mode for intervention. The public financial support for environmental actions is the most 
commonly used instrument for improving environment performance of farmers. It is easy to 
find a justification for the public payments as a compensation for the provision of an 
“environmental service” by farmers. However, the share of farms covered by various agri-
environmental support schemes has not been significant. That is a result of voluntary (self-
selection) character of this mode which does not attract farmers with the highest environment 
enhancement costs (most intensive and damaging environment producers). In some cases, 
the low-rate of farmers’ compliance with the environmental contracts is a serious problem. 
The later cannot be solved by augmented administrative control (enormous enforcement 
costs) or introducing bigger penalty (politically and juridical intolerable measure). Principally, it 
                                                           
9 Permits can be taken out of market in order to raise the environmental quality above the “planned” 
(by the Government) level. 
 is estimated that the agri-environmental payments are efficient in maintaining the current level 
of environmental capital but less successful in enhancing the environmental quality.  
Another disadvantage of “payment system” is that once introduced it is practically 
difficult (“politically unacceptable”) to be stopped when goals are achieved or there are 
funding difficulties. Moreover, withdraw of subsidies may lead to further environmental harm 
since it would induce the adverse actions (intensification, return to conventional farming). 
Other critics of subsidies are associated with their “distortion effect”, negative impact on 
“entry-exit decisions” from polluting industry, unfair advantages to certain sectors in the 
country or industries in other countries, not considering the total costs (such as transportation 
and environmental costs, “displacement effect” in other countries).  
Often providing public information, recommendations, training and education to 
farmers, rural agents, and consumers are the most efficient form. In some cases, a pure 
public organization (in-house production, public provision) will be the most effective one as it 
is in the case of important agro-ecosystems and national parks; agrarian research, education 
and extension; agro-meteorological forecasts; border sanitary and veterinary control etc. 
Usually, specific public modes are effective if they are applied alone with other modes 
of public intervention. The necessity of combined intervention (a governance mix) is caused 
by: the complementarities (joint effect) of individual forms; restricted potential of some less 
expensive forms to achieve a certain (but not the entire) level of socially preferred outcome; 
possibility to get an extra benefits (e.g. “cross-compliance” requirement for participation in 
public programs); particularity of problems to be tackled; specific critical dimensions of 
managed activity; uncertainty (little knowledge, experience) associated with likely impact of 
new forms; needs for “precaution”; practical capability of State to organize (administrative 
potential to control, implement) and fund (direct budget resources and/or international 
assistance) different modes; and dominating (right, left) policy doctrine (Bachev, 2010b).  
Besides, the level of an effective public intervention (management) depends on the 
kind of problem and the scale of intervention. There are public involvements which are to be 
executed at local (farm, ecosystem, community, regional) level, while others require 
nationwide management. And finally, there are activities, which are to be initiated and 
coordinated at international (regional, European, worldwide) level due to the strong necessity 
for trans-border actions (needs for a cooperation in natural resources and environment 
management, for exploration of economies of scale/scale, for prevention of ecosystem 
disturbances, for governing of spill-overs) or consistent (national, local) government failures.  
The public (regulatory, inspecting, provision etc.) modes must have built special 
mechanisms for increasing the competency (decrease bounded rationality and 
powerlessness) of bureaucrats, beneficiaries, interests groups and public at large as well as 
restricting the possible opportunism (opportunity for cheating, interlinking, abuse of power, 
corruption) of public officers and other stakeholders. That could be made by training, 
introducing new monitoring, assessment and communication technologies, increasing 
transparency (e.g. independent assessment and audit), and involving experts, beneficiaries, 
and interests groups in management of public modes at all levels. Furthermore, applying 
“market like” mechanisms (competition, auctions) in public projects design, selection and 
implementation would significantly increase the incentives and decrease the overall costs.  
Principally, a pure public organization should be used as a last resort when all other 
modes do not work effectively (Williamson). “In-house” public organization has higher (direct 
and indirect) costs for setting up, running, controlling, reorganization, and liquidation. What is 
 more, unlike market and private forms there is not automatic mechanism (competition) for 
sorting out the less effective modes10. Here a public “decision making” is required which is 
associated with high costs and time, and it is often influenced by strong private interests 
(power of lobbying groups, policy makers and their associates, employed bureaucrats) rather 
than the efficiency. What is more, widespread “inefficiency by design” of public modes is 
practiced to secure (rent-taking) positions of certain interest groups, stakeholders, 
bureaucrats etc. Along with development of general institutional environment (“The Rule of 
Law”, transparency) and monitoring, measurement, communication etc. technologies, the 
efficiency of pro-market modes (regulation, information, recommendation) and contract forms 
would get bigger advantages over the internal less flexible public arrangements.  
Usually hybrid modes (public-private partnership) are much more efficient than pure 
public forms given coordination, incentives, and control advantages. In majority of cases, 
involvement of farmers, farmers organizations and other beneficiaries increases efficiency - 
decreases asymmetry of information, restricts opportunisms, increases incentives for private 
costs-sharing, and reduces management costs (Bachev, 2004). For instance, a hybrid mode 
would be appropriate for carrying out the supply of preservation of environment, biodiversity, 
landscape, historical and cultural heritages etc. That is determined by the farmers information 
superiority, strong interlinks of activity with traditional food production (economy of scope), 
high assets specificity to the farm (farmers competence, high cite-specificity of investments to 
the farm and land), and spatial interdependency (needs for cooperation of farmers at a 
regional or wider scale), and not less important – farm’s origin of negative externalities. 
Furthermore, enforcement of most labour, animal welfare, biodiversity etc. standards is often 
very difficult or impossible at all. In all these cases, stimulating and supporting (assisting, 
training, funding) private voluntary actions are much more effective then mandatory public 
modes in terms of incentive, coordination, enforcement, and disputing costs.   
If there is a strong need for a third-party public involvement but an effective 
(government, local authority, international assistance) intervention is not introduced in a due 
time, then the agrarian “development” is substantially deformed. Thus public (Government) 
failure is also possible and often prevails. In Bulgaria, there have been a great number of bad 
examples for public under- and over-interventions in agrarian sector during post-communist 
transition now (Bachev, 2010b). Consequently, a primitive and uncompetitive small-scale 
farming; predominance of over-integrated and personalized exchanges; ineffective and 
corrupted agrarian bureaucracy; blocking out all class of agrarian transactions (innovation 
and extension supply, long-term credit supply, supply of infrastructure and environmental 
goods); and development of a large informal (gray) sector, all they have come out as a result. 
The Institutional analysis let define the efficiency and the potential of divers 
mechanisms and modes of management to deal with diverse problems and risks associated 
with the natural environment. Moreover, it let improve the design of the new forms of public 
intervention according to the specific market, institutional and natural environment of a 
particular farms, eco-system, region, sub-sector, country, and in terms of perfection of 
coordination, adaptation, information, stimulation, restriction of opportunism, controlling (in 
short – minimizing transaction costs) of participating actors (decision-makers, implementers, 
beneficiaries, other stakeholders). What is more, that analysis unable us to predict likely 
cases of new public (local, national, international) failures due to impossibility to mobilize 
                                                           
10 It is not rare to see highly inefficient but still “sustainable“ public organizations around the world. 
 sufficient political support and necessary resources and/or ineffective implementation of 
otherwise “good” policies in the specific socio-economic environment of a particular country, 
region, sub-sector etc. Since public failure is a feasible option its timely detection permits 
foreseeing the persistence or rising of certain environmental problems, and informing (local, 
international) community about associated risks.         
 
2. Evolution of agri-environmental management in Bulgarian  
 
Institutional environment for agri-eco management 
 
During most of transition, rights on agrarian resources (farmland, water) and diverse 
eco-rights (on clean, aesthetic nature; preservation of nature resources, biodiversity) were not 
defined or were badly defined and enforced (Figure 7). Inefficient public enforcement of laws, 
and absolute and contracted rights was common. That has negative consequences on the 
development of farming structures and efficiency of eco-management (Bachev, 2010b).  
Privatization of farmland and assets of ancient public farms took almost 10 years to 
complete. During a good part of that period, the management of critical agrarian resources 
was in ineffective and “temporary” structures (organizations under privatization, liquidation or 
reorganization; Land commissions etc.) with no interests in effective and sustainable 
exploitation. Besides, short-term lease of natural resources and material assets was a major 
form for the farm extension (Bachev, 2010b).  
Out-dated and sectoral system of public policing, regulations and control dominated 
until recently, which corresponded little to the contemporary needs of eco-management. 
There was no modern system for monitoring the state of soil, water, and air quality, and 
credible information on the extent of environmental degradation. There was no awareness of 
the “concept” of sustainable development and any needs to include it in the public policy, and 
private and community agenda. The lack of “culture of sustainability” has also impeded the 
evolution of voluntary measures, and private and collective actions (and institutions) for 
effective eco-management. 
Before the EU accession, country’s laws, standards and institutions were harmonized 
with the Community Acquis. That introduced a modern framework for eco-governance 
including new rights (restrictions) on protection of environment, integrated territory, water and 
biodiversity management, preservation of traditional varieties and breeds, animal welfare, 
polluter pay principle s well as corresponding control, monitoring, and assessment institutions 
(e.g. Executive Environmental Agency, Hydro-melioration Agency11 etc.). 
The EU accession introduces and enforces a “new order” - strict regulations and 
control; tough quality and environmental standards; financial support for eco-conservation 
and market instability etc. Huge European markets are opened which enhances competition 
and lets local farms explore their comparative advantages (low costs, high quality, specificity 
and purity of produce) and give strong incentives for investments in farm modernization and 
conforming to high product, technology and eco-standards.  
The external demand, monitoring, pressure, and sanctions by the EU lead to better 
enforcement of laws and standards. Internal collective actions and social demand for good 
governance have also got momentum leading to improvement of public management – e.g. 
                                                           
11 Closed in 2010 and activity transferred to the MAF Department of Hydro-melioration. 
 success of eco-organizations putting a 5-year ban on GM crops, timely reaction against eco-
violation in protected zones, revoking unlawful “exchanges” of valuable public lands etc. 
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Figure 7. Evolution of environmental management in Bulgarian agriculture 
 
Nevertheless, new “rules of the game” have not been clearly understood by public 
authorities, private organizations and individuals. There is not yet readiness for effective 
implementation of new public order because of the lack of information and experience or 
administrative capacity (lack of comprehension, deficient court system, corruption). Often, 
enforcement of eco-standards is difficult since costs for detection and penalizing of offenders 
are high, or there is no direct links between the performance and eco-impact – e.g. banned 
fields burning after harvesting is still widespread in the country (EEA).  
 The institutional modernization has been also associated with new conflicts between 
diverse private, collective and social interests. However, the results of the public choices have 
not always been for the advantage of effective eco-management. For instance, strong 
lobbying efforts of certain private groups and businesses led to a 20% reduction in numbers 
and 50% reduction in the area of initially identified sites for pan-European network NATURA 
2000 (MWE). 
 
Private modes of agri-eco-management 
 
Newly evolving market and private structures were inefficient in dealing with various 
economic and eco-issues. Privatization of farmland and assets of ancient public farms took 
10 years to complete while some state assets (e.g. irrigation, services etc.) were not 
effectively reorganised until recently. During much of the period, the management of 
farmland, land related assets (permanent crops; buildings; irrigation, drainage and flood 
protection facilities), eco-systems and water-resources, was in ineffective “temporary” 
structures (organisation under privatisation, liquidation or reorganisation; Privatization Boards, 
Liquidation Councils, Land Commissions etc.). Sales and long-term lease markets for land 
and other natural resources did not emerge until 2000, and annual leasing was the major 
form for management until recently. That was combined with high economic and institutional 
uncertainty and a big inter-dependency of agrarian assets (Bachev, 2010b). 
Much of the farming activities were carried in inefficient and unsustainable structures – 
public farms, part-time and subsistence farms, production cooperatives, and huge business 
farms based on provisional lease-in contracts (Table 1). Most livestock holdings are also 
miniature “unprofessional” breading the majority of animals in the country (Table 2).  
Farms adjustments and intensifying competition have been associated with a 
significant decrease in number of unregistered, cooperative and livestock holdings without 
adequate transfer of land, livestock, and environmental management to other structures. 
Despite some augmentation of average farm size, the share of abandoned agricultural lands 
and primitive domestic livestock operations has been considerable from the beginning of 
transition now. 
Dominating modes for carrying out farming activities have had little incentives for 
current and long-term investment to enhance productivity and environmental performance 
(Bachev, 2008).  
The cooperative’s big membership makes individual and collective control on 
management very difficult and costly. That focuses managerial efforts on short-term 
indicators, gives a great possibility for mismanagement and using cooperatives in the best 
private (managers and associates) interests. Besides, there are differences in the investment 
preferences of diverse coops members due to the non-tradable nature of the cooperative 
shares (“horizon problem”). Given the fact that most members are small shareholders, older 
in age, and non-permanent employees, the incentives for long-term investment for land 
improvement, environmental conservation, and renovation of material and biological assets 
have been low. “Member-oriented” (non-for-profit) nature of the cooperatives also prevents 
them to adapt to diversified needs of members, and market demand and competition. 
 
 
 
 Table 1. Number, size and importance of different farms in Bulgaria  
 
   Public Unregistered Cooperatives    Agro-firms    Total 
Number of farms      
           1989         2101           1600000 na na   1602101 
           1995         1002           1772000                 2623                 2200   1777000 
           2000           232             755300                 3125                 2275     760700 
           2010            350900                 900               6100   357900 
Share in number (%)      
           1989          0.13                  99.9             100 
           1995                   99.7                    0.1                    0.1           100 
           2000                   99.3                    0.4                    0.3           100 
           2010                   98.0                  0.25                    1.7           100 
Share in farmland (%)      
           1989          89.9                  10.1             100 
           1995            7.2                  43.1                  37.8                  11.9           100 
           2000            1.7                  19.4                  60.6                  18.4           100 
           2010                   33.5                  23.9                  42.5           100 
Average size (ha)      
           1989      2423.1                    0.4              3.6 
           1995        338.3                    1.3                   800                   300            2.8 
           2000        357.7                    0.9                709.9                296.7            4.7 
           2010                     2.9                   807                211.6            8.5 
 
Source: National Statistical Institute  
 
  
Table 2. Number and size of livestock holdings  
 
Type of Share Share Share Average 
holdings farms  heads  farms heads   farms    heads heads 
Dairy cows 1-2 3-9 20 and  >  
      2003 87.3 56.3 11 23.3 0.6 13.5 1.9 
      2009 79.6 30.1 14.6 20.0 2.3 36,3 3.3 
Buffalo cows         
      2003 85.3 47.5 11.4 20.6 1.2 23 2.3 
      2009 63.5 11.4 21.6 11.5 6.9 60,7 7.3 
Ewes 1-9 10-49 100 and  >  
      2003 56.7 89.3 26 9.6 9.5 0,4 5.9 
      2009 29.8 82.8 22.6 13.2 33.2 1,7 10 
She-goats        
      2003 98.2 86.8 1.2 5.8 0.1 3 2.6 
      2009 96.2 67.3 3.3 20.2 0.01 5 3.1 
Breeding pigs 1-2 3-9 200 and >  
      2003 87.1 34.5 10.2 14.0 0.2 35.1 3.0 
      2009  78.8     12.8    14.9 8.8    0.5 57.4 7.8 
 
Source: Ministry of Agriculture and Food  
 
 On the other hand, small-scale and subsistent farms12 possess insignificant internal 
capacity for investment, and small potential to explore economy of scale and scope (big 
fragmentation and inadequate scale). Besides, they have little incentives for non-productive 
environment and biodiversity conservation, animal welfare etc. spending. Moreover, there 
has been neither administrative capacity nor a political will to enforce the quality and eco-
standards in that vast informal sector of the economy. Primitive technologies and low 
compliance with modern agronomic, safety and eco-standards are widespread. Dairy sector 
is particularly vulnerable since only one-third of holdings meet formal EU standards (MAF). 
Larger business farms operate mainly on leased land and concentrate on high pay-off 
investment with a short pay-back period (e.g. cereals, sunflower). They are more sensitive to 
market demand and institutional regulations since largely benefit or lose from timely 
adaptation to new standards and market preferences. Besides, these enterprises have 
higher capacity to fund and adapt to new formal and market requirements. However, until 
recently, there has been no effective outside (authority, community) pressure for respecting 
eco-rules by the business enterprises. 
Restructuring of commercial farms continues as most of them apply survival tactics 
(“concentration on products with secure marketing”) rather than a long-term strategy toward 
sustainability (preserving soil fertility, observing crop rotation and agro-techniques 
requirements) (Figure 8). What is more, a great portion of subsistent, smaller commercial 
farms and cooperatives are unable to adapt to evolving market, institutional and natural 
environment – intensified market competition; new EU quality, safety, and eco-standards; 
challenges associated with climate change etc. Our survey has found out that more than a 
quarter of farms are with a low potential for adaptation to new state and EU quality, safety, 
and environmental standards, almost 37% of them are less adaptable to market demand, 
prices and competition, and every other one is inadaptable to evolving natural environment 
(warning, extreme weather, droughts, floods, etc.) 
  
	 	 
 
Figure 8. Share of farms implementing different strategies in Bulgaria (percent) 
Source: interviews with farm managers, 2009  
	 
Medium-term sustainability of farms is estimated as low for unregistered holdings, 
                                                           
12 Subsistence and semi-market farms comprise the best part of farms as almost 1 million are 
involved in farming mostly on a part-time base and for “supplementary” income (MAF). 
 grazing livestock, and pigs and poultry farms (Figure 9). Less that 7% of all farms “forecast” a 
high sustainability. A particular type of firms (companies) is the only exception where majority 
of enterprises envisages being highly sustainable in years to come. The later reflects both 
the environmental sustainability and the ability of holdings to manage eco-projects. 
Smaller size, owner operating and extensive nature of majority of farms let avoid 
certain problems of large public enterprises from the past such as over-intensification, lost 
natural landscape, biodiversity, nitrate and pesticide contamination, huge livestock and 
manure concentration, and uncontrolled erosion. Subsistent and small-scale farming has also 
revived some traditional and more sustainable technologies, varieties, and products, and 
avert Mad cow disease and Avian flu epidemic.  
 
 
 
Figure 9. Share of farms with different levels of medium-term sustainability in Bulgaria 
Source: interviews with farm managers, 2010  
 
Private mode has introduced incentives and possibilities for integral eco-management 
(including revival of eco- and cultural heritage; anti-pollution, esthetic, an comfort measures), 
investing in eco-system services, origins, labels, and profiting from inter-dependent activities 
such as farming, fishing, agro-tourism, processing, and marketing. There are good examples 
for private introduction and enforcement of quality and eco-standards by individual farms 
(voluntary and trade initiatives), a vertical integrator (dairy and vine processor, retailer, 
exporter), or a foreign investor (cereals, oil crops). 
Private management is associated with improved environmental stewardship on 
owned and marketed resources, but less concern to manure and garbage management, 
over-exploitation of leased and common resources, and contamination of soils, waters and 
air. The process of farms adaptation leads to intensification of production which could revive 
or deepen some eco-problems unless a pro-environmental management is put in place. 
Moreover, free market management of giant and semi-monopoly servicing (water, insurance 
etc.) companies usually comes with unfavourable pricing and terms for majority of farms. 
In 1990s the State monopoly “Irrigation Systems” was reorganized into a Joint-stock 
company owned by the Ministry of Agriculture and responsible for the management of state 
assets, provision of irrigation and drinking water, drainage and flood protection. Furthermore, 
the Union of Water Users was initiated and 176 Water User Associations (WUA) emerged. 
This collective form was unable to improve efficiency (low incentives, lack of ownership) and 
 deal with monopoly position of 21 semi-autonomous regional branches of Irrigation Systems.   
Since 2001 the user-rights on irrigation assets of Irrigation Systems have been freely 
transferred to newly-reestablished WUA. Around 70 WUA are formed servicing 30% of the 
total equipped for irrigation area. However, expected “boom” in efficiency from collective 
management of irrigation has not materialized because of the semi-monopoly situation 
(terms, pricing) of regional water suppliers, few incentives for water users to innovate 
facilities and expand irrigation, and uncompleted privatization of state assets (Bachev, 2011).  
Evolution of various farmers and eco-associations in the country has been hampered 
by the big number and diversified interests of agents – a different ownership size, operation, 
type of farming, preferences, age, and horizon. However, there are few examples for effective 
agrarian organizations mostly with small-membership and strong common interests of 
participants (e.g. tobacco, silk-warm, bee-honey etc.). Furthermore, in recent years some 
environmental organisations have been quite successful in eco-monitoring, campaigns 
against GM crops cultivation and removal of restrictions in protected areas, and other actions 
such as garbage cleaning.  For instance, among other activities Bulgarian Association of Bird 
Protection monitors the birds species varieties and numbers in different type of territories.  
 
Market modes for agri-eco management 
 
Market-driven organic farming has emerged recently and registered a significant 
growth. There has been 11 folds increase in the number of organic operators13  since 2003, 
and the organic producers comprise the largest part (74%) of the organic operators totaling 
432 farms, processors, and traders (EUROSTAT).  
There is enormous augmentation of organic areas and livestock but they are a tiny 
portion of the Utilized Agricultural Area (UAA) and livestock (Table 3). “Fully converted 
organic areas” accounts for 25.4% of total organic areas with Industrial crops, Pastures and 
meadows, and Permanent crops comprising the biggest shares of fully converted areas 
(EUROSTAT). There are few livestock farms and apiaries certified for bio-production with 
highest growth in organic goats and sheep, and a lion share of bees. There are also 242677 
ha approved for gathering of wild organic fruits and herbs (MAF). 
Organic form has been introduced by business entrepreneurs who managed to 
organize and fund this new venture arranging independent certification and finding buyers for 
highly specific output. Produced bio-fruits, vegetables, oil plants, herbs, spices, and honey 
are mostly for export since a tiny market for organic products exists in the country. The slow 
development of organic market is caused by the high prices of products, and limited 
consumer confidence in the authentic character of products and certification.  
Eco-labeling of processed farm products (self-regulation) has also appeared but it is 
perceived more as a part of the marketing strategy of companies rather than a genuine eco-
action. What is more, (free) market management of semi-monopoly servicing companies 
comes with unfavorable pricing and terms for farmers, and only few among them purchase 
water or insurance against natural disasters (draughts, floods etc). 
 
                                                           
13  Organic operator is any natural or legal person who produces, prepares, imports, exports or deals 
with organic products (EUROSTAT, 2010). 
 
  
Table 3. Evolution of organic production in Bulgaria   
  
Organic indicators 2003 2004 2005 2006 2007 2008 
Farming area, ha 650 1113 2432 3061 11808 16663 
% in UAA 0.01 0.02 0.05 0.06 0.23 0.33 
Wild herbs, fruits, ha - - - 110143 397835 397835 
Cattle na na 395 na 395 470 
% in all cattle   0.11  0.11 0.14 
Sheep na na 294 na 1690 2471 
% in all sheep   0.02  0.14 0.21 
Goats na na 32 na 1058 na 
% in all goats   0.01  0.12  
Bees colonies na na 23508 na 35747 na 
 
Source: Ministry of Agriculture and Food, EUROSTAT  
 
Public modes for agri-eco-management 
 
During the transitional period public (Government and local authority) intervention in 
environmental management was not significant, comprehensive, sustainable, or even related 
(Bachev, 2008). Eco-policies were fragmented and reactive to urgent problems (natural 
disasters) with different agencies responsible for individual aspects of eco-management.  
In passed years a number of national programs have been developed to deal with 
specific eco-challenges such as: preservation of biodiversity and environment; limitation of 
emissions of Sulphur Dioxide, VOC, Ammonia; waste management; development of water 
sector; combating climate change; developing organic agriculture; management of lands and 
fights against desertification; agrarian and rural development etc. National monitoring 
systems of environment and biodiversity are also set up, and mandatory eco-assessment of 
public programs introduced. Nevertheless, actual eco-policies rest fragmented and largely 
reactive to urgent eco-problems (floods, storms, drought) rather that based on a long-term 
strategy for sustainable development. As a result of inefficient priority setting, management 
and enforcement (bad coordination, gaps, incompetence, ineffective enforcement, 
corruption), and administrative capability14 a minor impact of public programs prevails. 
National expenditures for protection and restoration of environment are merely 1.9% of 
GDP, and agriculture is getting a tiny portion of the total public eco-spending (MEW). What is 
more, recent financial and economic crisis further deteriorated funding of public (including 
environmental) projects. For instance, recultivation of degradated farmlands by MAF was 
initiated recently but it accounts only for 200-250 ha per year (EEA). Similarly, serious eco-
challenge is still caused by the state deficiency in storing and disposal of out-of-dated 
pesticides which are responsible for a good part of all polluted localities in the country (EEA).  
                                                           
14 e.g. due to organizational and financial reasons Ministry of Water and Environment often does not 
get the relevant water information from the institutes of Bulgarian Academy of Sciences (EEA). 
 There has been a numerous international (UN, EU, NGOs etc.) assistance projects to 
“fill the gap” in local failures but they have been limited in scale, unsustainable in time; often 
overtaken by local groups, funding improperly used; and with no significant positive impact.  
Agrarian education and the National Agricultural Advisory Service (NAAS) has not 
been effectively reorganized and provide modern and continues training on rural development 
and eco-, climate change, and water-management issues. They do not reach all agents via 
effective methods of education, advice and information suited to the specific needs of 
different agents.  
Furthermore, the integral approach of soil, water and biodiversity management in 
planning, funding, management, monitoring, controlling and assessment is not applied, and 
stakeholders involved in decision-making process at all levels. Neither modern eco-system 
services, life-cycle, water accounts, and other modern approaches have been incorporated 
into program management.  
Environmental data collection and monitoring have significantly improved in the last 
few years caching up with the modern EU standards. However, adequate information and 
independent assessment has not been secured yet and include: agricultural benefits and 
impacts; waters quality; total costs; eco- and water-foot prints; impacts of climate change; 
existing and likely risks etc. Nor mechanisms for timely disclosure and effective 
communication of data to decision-makers, stakeholders and public at large are assured.  
Agrarian and environment related research has not been modernized and severely 
underfunded in last twenty years. Consequently, agro-environmental innovation as well as the 
understanding of the agricultural use and impacts on natural environment, and various 
aspects, factors and efficiency of eco-management greatly deterred.  
Furthermore, during most of the transition agrarian long-term credit market was 
practically blocked while newly evolving farming structures left unassisted by the government. 
Until 2000 the Aggregate Level of Support to Agriculture was close to zero, and very small 
afterward (Bachev, 2010b). Besides, the multifunctional role of farming was not recognized, 
and the provision of “environmental service” funded by society. 
There has been enormous progress in public support in recent years – e.g. National 
Fund Agriculture, EU Special Pre-accession Program for Agrarian and Rural Development 
(SAPARD), EU CAP measures etc.  SAPARD introduced measure “Agro-ecology” but it was 
not approved by the end 2006 and few projects were actually supported. In 2008 EC 
suspended SAPARD due to mismanagement and a significant funding lost. 
EU accession brought new opportunities for public support to private and collective 
agrarian and eco-activities. CAP and the National Plan for Agrarian and Rural Development 
2007-2013 (NPARD) provide significant funding for EU area-based payments and national 
top-ups; agro-environmental measures (organic farming, management of agricultural lands 
with high natural value and handicaps, traditional livestock, protection of soils and water, 
preservation of landshaft); modernization of farms, processing, and marketing; diversification 
of activity; infrastructural development; keeping traditions; training etc. Specialized budget of 
NPARD directed for various eco-measures accounts for 27% of the total. Funding for eco- 
and other projects is also available from EU Fund LIFE+ and the Operational Programs 
“Environment”, “Fishery and Aquaculture”, and “Regional Development”. 
The “cross-compliance” (with safety, animal-welfare, environmental etc. standards) for 
receiving a public support has been also introduced. Consequently, area-based direct 
 payments and other subsidies improved farms income and eco-performance, induced farming 
on abandoned lands, and brought about some amelioration of environmental situation.  
However, it becomes difficult to reform the inefficient system of management of public 
programs. In 2007 no public payment was made for projects associated with NPARD 
measures but area-based payments for regions with handicaps. Progression in the 
implementation of public support has been slow and far behind the targets (Table 4). While 
measures “Setting up of young farmers” and “Payments to farmers in regions with handicaps” 
are successful, the number of approved and funded projects in other areas is insignificant.  
 
Table 4. Progress in implementation of 2007-2013 NPARD in Bulgaria (percent of target)  
 
Dec. 31, 2008 Dec. 31, 2009 Aug. 23, 2010 Measures 
Projects Euro Projects Euro Projects Euro 
111 Training and information  0 - 0 - na - 
112 Setting up young farmers 11.25 - 55.20 - 99.73 - 
121 Modernization of farms 6.77 6.27 27.86 16.09 35.62 25.49 
122 Economic value of forests 0 0 0 0 0 0 
123 Value to agricultural and 
forestry products 
0 0 0 0 5.81 4.41 
141 Semi-subsistence farm 0 - 0 - 3.37 - 
142 Producer groups 0 0 0 0 0 0 
143 Advice and consultation  3.62 - 9.30 - 24.38 - 
211 Payments to mountainous 
areas with handicaps  
40.04 - 43.50 - 43.50 - 
212 Payments to other areas 
with handicaps  
100.17 - 107.85 - 107.85 - 
214 Environment payments 2.80 - 4.45 - 4.45 - 
223 First afforestation 0 - 1.00  1.85 - 
226 Restoring forestry  0 - 0.90 - 2.30 - 
311 Diversification into non-
agricultural activities 
0 - 0 - 0.09 0 
312 Business development 0 - 0 - 2.09 - 
313 Agro and rural tourism 0 0 0 0 0 0 
321 Rural services  0 - 4.77 - 8.15 46.19 
322 Village development 0 - 18.00 - 19.50 43.07 
431-32 Local cooperation  0 - 0 - 7.92 - 
 
Source: Ministry of Agriculture and Food 
 
Due to the restrictive criteria15, lack of formal land management titles, complicated and 
costly procedures, and widespread mismanagement, the new public support is not effectively 
utilized and benefits unevenly different farms. Mostly bigger farms participate in public 
programs because of the superior entrepreneurial experience, available resources, and 
capability for adaptation to formal requirements and for wining projects.  
                                                           
15 For area-based payments the minimum farm size is 1 ha (for permanent crops 0.5 ha), and for agro-
ecological payments 0.5 ha, while landless livestock holdings are not-eligible for these type of support. 
 Up to date experience shows that the bulk of public subsidies go to few large agri-firms 
and cooperatives specialized in field crops. At the same time, many effective small-scale 
farms receive no or only a tiny fraction of the public support. For instance, despite it increased 
number only 24% of all farms currently receive area based payments, and merely 6% of cattle 
holdings, 4% of sheep and pig holdings, and 3% of poultry farms (MAF). Moreover, less than 
7% of beneficiaries get the lion share (more than 80%) of all direct payments. Similarly, 
around 2% of the biggest farms (more than 500 ha) manage around 60% of supported by the 
environmental measures 211 and 212 areas (MAF).   
The overall support to agriculture continues to rest low, and a small proportion of farms 
benefits from public aid most of them being large enterprises from regions with less socio-
economic and eco-problems. Recent assessment indicates that there is a good or significant 
impact of CAP implementation on economic, social and environmental sustainability of large 
farms, agri-firms, and farms specialized in field crops, while the CAP effect on other type of 
farms is insignificant or neutral (Bachev 2012a). Therefore, public assistance further enlarges 
“transitional” disparities between different farms, sub-sectors, eco-systems, and regions. The 
minor amount of supported farms and agro-ecosystems, deficiency of clear criteria for eco-
performance, and the lack of effective control leads to little contribution of new public (CAP) 
measures to improvement of eco-situation in the country. 
 
3. Efficiency of agri-environmental management in Bulgaria 
 
Efficiency of land management 
 
A by-product from the new market and private management has been considerable 
disintensification of agriculture, ease of general eco-pressure and pollution comparing to the 
pre-reform level.  
Market adjustment has been associated with a sharp decline in all crop (but sunflower) 
and livestock (but goat) productions since 198916. Some traditional crop varieties and 
livestock breeds have been also recovered. A considerable portion of agricultural lands has 
been left uncultivated for a long period - in some years abandoned land reached one third of 
the total (MAF). In recent years, unutilized farmlands are 10% of the total while fallow land 
accounts for 9% of the arable land. The average yields for major products shrunk to 40-80% 
of the pre-reform level.  
The number of livestock has also decreased significantly – 51% for cattle, 53% for 
poultry, 80 % for pigs, and 81% for sheep (MAF). Consequently, the Aggregate Livestock 
Index17 in the country has been one of the smallest in Europe - 0.4 in recent years (EEA). 
Tractors and combines employed in agriculture have diminished by 64%, and now 
5.6% of farms own tractors and 0.7% harvesters while 30-40% hire or use them in association 
(MAF). All these have relaxed the overall agricultural pressure on the environment. 
                                                           
16 For potatoes by 33%, wheat 50%, corn and burley 60%, tomatoes, Alfalfa hay and table grape 75%, 
apples 94%, pig meat 82%, cattle meat 77%, sheep and goat meat 72%, poultry meat 51%, cow milk 
45%, sheep milk 66%, buffalo milk 59%, wool 85%, eggs 45%, and honey 57% (NSI). 
17 the number of livestock units (equines, cattle, sheep, goats, pigs, poultry and rabbits) per UAA. 
 The amount of fertilizers and pesticides used in agriculture has declined considerably, 
and now their per ha application is 22% and 31% of the 1989 level (Figure 10). In recent 
years N, P and K fertilizers are applied for 37.4%, 3.4% and 1.9% of UAA (MAF). A sharp 
reduction in chemical use has diminished drastically the risk of chemical contamination of 
soils, waters, and farm produce. A good part of farm production has got (semi) “organic” 
character obtaining a good reputation for high quality and safety locally and internationally.  
 
 
Figure 10. Irrigation and chemical application in Bulgarian agriculture   
Source: National Statistical Institute   
 
However, a negative rate of fertilizer compensation of N, P, K intakes dominate and 
average of 23595,4t N, 61033,3t P205 and 184392t K20 have been irreversibly removed 
annually from soils since 1990 (EEA). Unbalance of nutrient components has been typical 
with application of 5.3 times less P and 6.7 times less K with the appropriate N rate. What is 
more, monoculture or simple rotation has been constantly practiced by large operators 
concentrating on few profitable crops (sunflower, cereals etc.). All these practices further 
contributed to deterioration of soil quality and soil organic matter content. 
There has been considerable increase in farmland affected by acidification (Figure 11). 
That is a result of the long-term application of specific nitrate fertilizers and unbalanced 
fertilizer application without adequate input of phosphorus and potassium The share of 
acidified soil decreased after 1994, but in recent years there is a reverse tendency along with 
the augmentation of N use. As much as 4.5% of acidified farmlands are with level harmful for 
crops.  
Fraction of salinized land doubled after 1989 but it is merely 1.1% of the total farmland 
(EEA). Widespread application of primitive irrigation techniques, and inappropriate crop 
choice, rotation and agro-techniques augment inefficiency of water use and local soil erosion.  
Since 1990 no effective measures are taken to normalize soil acidity and salinity. 
Pollution of soil and water from industrial activities, waste management, and improper 
farming activities is also a serious environment and health risk. Illegal garbage yards in rural 
areas have noticeably increased reaching an official figure of 4000 with a real number far 
bigger than reported amount (EEA). Farms contribute extensively to waste “production” with 
organic and industrial materials contributing significantly to local pollution of air, water, soils, 
 and disturbing population comfort (noise, odor, dirty roads etc.). Nevertheless, data for the 
last years show that soils in the country are in good ecological state both in terms of organic 
content and contamination with heavy metals and metalloids. Polluted with heavy metals and 
pesticides soils represents bellow 1% of the farmlands (EEA). 
 
Figure 11. Share of degradated agricultural lands in Bulgaria (percent)    
Source: Executive Environment Agency   
 
Erosion has been a major factor contributing to land degradation (Figure 12). Its 
progressing level is a result of extreme weather but it has been also adversely affected by the 
dominant agro-techniques, deficiency of anti-erosion measures, uncontrolled deforestation, 
and recultivation of permanent grasslands. Due to ineffective management 34% of arable 
lands are subjected to wind erosion and 64% to water erosion (EEA). Since 1990, erosion 
affects 25-65% of farmland and losses varied from 0.2 to 40 t/ha in different years. Annual 
losses of earth masses from water erosion are estimated at 145Mt and two-third of it comes 
from the arable land. Soil losses from water erosion depend on cultivation practices and 
range from 8 t/y for permanent crops to 48 t/y for arable lands. Losses from wind erosion are 
around 30 t/y and depend on deforestation, uncontrolled pasture, ineffective crop rotation, 
plowing pastures etc. 
Soil compression affects (mostly) agricultural lands due to untimely transportation and 
inappropriate agro-techniques (e.g. using heavy machineries when soil moisture is high). It is 
considered as a threat for soils but no data are available for the extent in agricultural lands. 
 
Efficiency of water management 
 
Restructuring of farms and production has been accompanied with a sharp reduction in 
irrigated farmland and a considerable distortion of irrigation facilities (Figure 10). There has 
been more than 21 folds decline in water used in agriculture comparing to 1989 (Table 5). In 
recent years, sector “Agriculture, hunting, forestry and fishery” comprises merely 3.2% of the 
total water use, and 0.3% of generated waste waters (NSI). All these contribute to a 
considerable reduction of water stress in the country - since 1990 the Water Exploitation 
Index declined considerably from 55% (the second in Europe) to 33% (EEA). 
 
 Table 5. Evolution and agricultural use of water resources in Bulgaria  
 
Indicators 1988-
1992 
1993-
1997 
1998-
2002 
2003-
2007 
Total water resources (109/m3/year) 21 21 21 21 
Water resources per capita (m3/inhabitant/year) 2427 2562 2661 2748 
Total water withdrawal (109/m3/year) 14,04 na 8,674 na 
Agricultural water withdrawal (109/m3/year) 3,058 0,141 0,144 0,143 
Share of agricultural water withdrawal in total (%) 21.78 - 1.66 - 
Share of total actual renewable water resources 
withdrawn by agriculture (%) 
14.36 0.66 0.68 0.67 
Area equipped for irrigation (1000 ha) 1263 789 622 104,6 
Share of cultivated area equipped for irrigation (%) 29.17 17.55 17.36 3.18 
Area equipped for irrigation actually irrigated (%) na 5.42 4.96 51.29 
 
Source: FAO, AQUASTAT  
 
There is a huge reduction of irrigated farmland after 1990 as 2-5% of the irrigation 
network has been actually used18. What is more, a considerable physical distortion of 
irrigation facilities has taken place affecting most part of the internal canals. As a result the 
area equipped for irrigation in agriculture substantially decreased. Furthermore, primitive 
irrigation techniques have been widespread and augmented inefficiency of water use and 
local soil erosion. Water losses in the irrigation system amount 70% as consequence of the 
poorly maintained facilities, low efficiency, and water stealing (Alexandrov). Nevertheless, the 
overall negative irrigation impact of irrigation on erosion and salinization has been diminished 
considerably after 1990 (EEA). 
The decline in irrigation has also had a direct harmful effect on crop yields and 
structure of rotation. The level of irrigation depends on the humidity in each year, kind of 
irrigated crops and water prices. Irrigation has not been effectively used to correct 
inappropriate seasonal and regional distribution of rainfalls, and mitigate effect of climate 
change19 on farming and land degradation. Farms little capability for adaptation has resulted 
in huge crop, livestock and property losses during recent droughts and floods. 
There has been a considerable amelioration of the quality of surface and ground 
waters as a result of unintended decrease of negative impact of agriculture and the sharp 
decline in chemical fertilizers and pesticides application. This trend has diminished drastically 
the pressure on environment and the risk of chemical contamination of soils and waters. 
Nitrate and phosphate content in surface water decreased throughout transition and 
slightly increase in the last 3 years (EEA). Currently only 0.7% of samples exceeds the 
Ecological Limit Value (ELV) for nitrate. Despite improvement, many water eco-systems are 
                                                           
18 Irrigation water accounts for the major share in total agricultural water use – 74.2% (NSI). 
19 Eighteen of the past 21 years are with positive anomalies in average temperatures and there is a 
trend for increasing soils’ water deficiency (EEA). According to climate forecasts temperature will 
continue to increase, rains quantity to decrease, more extreme events (thunderstorms, floods, 
droughts, hurricane winds) to occur, and water stress experienced around the country.  
 at risk cased by the agricultural emissions in water and increasing application of chemicals. In 
drinking water around 5% of analyses show deviation of nitrates up to 5 times above the 
appropriate level (EEA). The later is mostly restricted to 400 small residential locations but it 
is also typical for almost 9% of the big water collection zones. Improper use of nitrate 
fertilizers, inappropriate crop and livestock practices, and non-compliance with the specific 
rules for farming in water supply zones, are all responsible for that problem. 
Around a quarter of riverlength does not meet the standards for water quality (MAF). 
Monitoring of water for irrigation shows that in 45% of samples, the nitrates concentration 
exceeds contamination limit 2-20 folds (EEA). Nitrates are also the most common polluter of 
ground waters with slight excess over the ecological limit (EEA). A moderate concentration of 
N (bellow 25 mg per liter) in different levels of underground waters dominates with increasing 
trends in shallow waters and downward trends in others. Besides, around country a tendency 
for reduction in pesticides concentration in underground water is reported with occasional 
cases of Triasines over the ELV after 2000. There is further improvement since 2007 and the 
concentration of pesticides in all samples has been bellow the water quality standards.  
Nitrate Vulnerable Zones cover 53% of country’s territory and 68% of UAA (MAF). The 
lack of effective manure storage capacity and sewer systems in majority of farms, challenge 
posed by inadequate storage and disposal of expired and prohibited pesticides, and illegal 
garbage dumps in rural areas, all contributes significantly to the persistence of the problem. 
Most part of the post-communist livestock activity is carried out by a great number of small 
and primitive holdings often located within residential borders. Moreover, only 0.1% of the 
livestock farms possess safe manure-pile sites, around 81% of them use primitive dunghills, 
and 116 thousands holdings have no facilities at all (MAF). Besides, decreasing amount of 
manure has been used for fertilization of merely 0.2% of utilized farmlands in recent years. 
Serious eco-challenge has been posed by inadequate storage and disposal of expired 
and prohibited pesticides which amount has augmented since 2001(EEA). A good portion of 
country’s polluted localities (28%) is associated with these dangerous chemicals. Despite 
progression in management (modernization of storehouses, safe capsulation, exporting for 
deactivation) in the past years there are still 298 abandoned storehouses (57% of all) in 292 
locations containing 1956t old pesticides (15.3% of the total amount).  
In the last several years a stable amount of nullified sediments from industrial and 
residential waters have been utilized in agriculture and for recultivation of degradated lands. 
In 2010 the applied sediments in agriculture and for recultivation of degradated lands (13644t 
dry content) increased up to 49% share of the totally utilized sediments in the country (EEA). 
 
Efficiency of biodiversity management 
 
Since 1990 the amount of protected areas in the country almost doubled (NSI). 
Specially introduced rules for agricultural practices in NATURA territories and CAP eco- and 
other measures additionally created conditions for improvement of biodiversity management.  
Furthermore, market and private initiatives led to recovering of some traditional (and 
more sustainable) livestock breeds and plants varieties as well as introducing new crops and 
livestock (novel food, industrial and energy crops; exotic animals like ostrich etc.) increasing 
agricultural biodiversity. 
 Nevertheless, the widespread lack of proper eco-management has affected negatively 
biodiversity in some agro- and related ecosystems. For instance, the intensive cereal and 
industrial crop enterprises have paid little attention to biodiversity protection in enormous 
fields of operations. On the other hand, considerable portion of farmlands have been left 
uncultivated for a long time or entirely abandoned, and some agro-ecosystems lost their 
“agro” character turning into natural ecosystems. That has caused uncontrolled 
“development” of species allowing development of some of them and suppressing others.  
Some of the most valuable ecosystems (natural grassland) have been also severely 
damaged20. Part of the meadows has been left under-grazed or under mowed, and intrusion 
of shrubs and trees took places. Some fertile semi-natural grasslands have been converted to 
cultivation of crops, vineyards, or orchards. This has resulted in irreversible disappearance of 
plant species diversity. In addition, certain municipal and state pastures (with official and/or 
practical “common access” status) have been degraded by unsustainable use (over-grazing) 
by private and domestic animals. Besides, a reckless collection of valuable wild plants 
(berries, herbs, flowers) and animals (snail, snakes, fish) have led to destruction of all natural 
habitats. 
The Index of Birds in Agricultural Lands in the country is negative and for the last 5 
years the variety of bird species under monitoring living in agricultural lands has decreased by 
10% (EEA). The birds in agricultural territories are with the largest amount of diminishing 
number (including moderate and strong tends) but there are no studies on factors for these 
trends. 
During the last decades there has been significant degrading impacts of agriculture on 
biodiversity as all 37 typical animal breeds have been endangered, among them 6 are 
irreversibly extinct, 12 are almost extinct, 16 are endangered, and 3 are potentially 
endangered (MEW). 
 
Efficiency of air and green-house gas management 
 
Agriculture practices contribute to dust and odor contamination of air in some areas. 
Particularly disturbing are the small-scale and domestic livestock operations often located 
within residential territories (villages, town) and increasing local odor and noise pollution.  
Agriculture is also responsible for considerable emissions of certain harmful 
substances in the air. It releases approximately 75% of Ammonia (NH3) and 11% of Non-
methane organic compounds (NMVOC) in the country (Figure 12). The biggest sources of 
NH3 are cattle (dairy cows and buffalo cows) and for NMVOC - one-year crops with 
fertilization (EEA). Agricultural contribution to Nitrogen oxides (NOx) and Carbon monoxide 
(CO) is insignificant – 2.3% and 0.4% accordingly. 
There has been enormous reduction of overall green-house gas (GHG) emissions from 
agriculture21 since 1988 (Figure 13). Moreover, the decline in the sector's contribution has 
                                                           
20 20% of agricultural lands in Bulgaria are lands of High Nature Value (MAF). 
21 GHGs from Agriculture” result from production and processing of agricultural products, soil 
fertilization, animal manure processing and preservation. Emissions from combustion processes for 
energy production and from agricultural machines are not reported but they are insignificant amount. 
 
 been higher than the national. That has come as “unintentional” outcome of the post-
communist restructuring of the sector and the new models of farm management.  
 
 
   
Figure 12. Harmful emissions in air from Bulgarian agriculture (2009) 
Source: Executive Environment Agency   
 
 
   
Figure 13. Trends in green-house gas emissions from Bulgarian agriculture 
Source: National Inventory Report for Greenhouse Gas Emissions  
 
During 2000-2004 there was a period of an increase and since then a stable trend for 
diminishing agricultural GHG emissions. The sector is the second biggest emitter of GHGs 
contributing between 7-10% of the total amount during the last decade. The main factors of 
agricultural GHGs have been agricultural soils (56%), enteric fermentation (22%), and 
manure management (19%) (EEA). 
Agriculture mostly produces N2O and CH4 emissions. In the last decade the majority of 
N2O emissions comes from agricultural soils, manure management, and fields burning. The 
methane emission is 36% of the agricultural GHGs and the biggest portion comes from 
enteric fermentation from domestic livestock and manure management. Reduction of 
livestock number is responsible for considerable decrease in agricultural CH4 emission in past 
 years. On the other hand, there is a six-fold increase of CH4 from rice cultivation since 1999 
as a result of the partial recovery of this sub-sector.  
Illegal field burning of residues and crops also emits GHGs-precursors which are not 
significant but they doubled since the period before 1990. 
 
4. Impacts of EU CAP on eco-performance of Bulgarian Farms 
 
Overall impact of EU CAP on farms eco-sustainability 
 
According to the most experts22 the overall impact from implementation of diverse EU 
CAP instruments (common market; new standards and restrictions; direct payments from EU 
and national top-ups; support measures of NPARD; mechanisms of market support of 
different sub-sectors and exports) on economic, social and environmental sustainability of 
large farms, firms, and farms specialized in field crops is good or significant (Figure 15).  The 
overall effect of CAP on sustainability of other type of farms is estimated as insignificant or 
neutral. 
 
  
 
Figure 15. Impact of EU CAP on economic, social and environmental sustainability of Bulgarian 
farms 
Source: Expertise with leading national experts 
 
According to the more than a half of surveyed farms23 EU CAP implementation is 
having a positive impact, mostly evaluated as good by the managers (Figure 16). The 
favourable effect of CAP on eco-sustainability is felt by all farms with areas with natural 
handicaps, forth-fifth of holdings in vegetables and mountainous regions, three-quarters of 
farms in crop-livestock production, more than two-third of farms with grazing livestock, more 
                                                           
22 Expertise was carried out in the end of 2011 with the 13 leading experts on farm structure and 
policies in Bulgaria. 
23 A survey with 84 managers of “representative” commercial farms of all type of juridical status, sizes, 
specializations, and geographical locations was conducted in the spring of 2012. The structure of 
surveyed farms approximately correspond to the current structure of commercial farms in the country. 
 than 69% of farms in plan-mountainous regions, 60% of Physical Persons, more than 58% of 
cooperative, and every other farm with small and middle sizes, in field crops, mix crops, and 
pigs, poultry and rabbits.  
 
 
Figure 16. Impact of EU CAP on environmental sustainability of Bulgarian farms 
Source: Interviews with farm managers 
 
None of surveyed farms do not report a negative impact of CAP on environmental 
aspects of their activity. Nevertheless, for all holdings with mix livestock and with areas in 
protected zones and territories, and the majority of farms with permanent crops, plan regions, 
and big sizes, the effect from implementation of CAP instruments on environmental 
sustainability is insignificant and/or neutral. 
The greatest share of surveyed farms indicates an increased level of a part of the main 
indicators in the present time comparing to the levels in the period before EU CAP 
implementation (Figure 17). For instance, higher or considerable higher is the level of the total 
income, costs, investments, profit, labour productivity, efficiency of the production and 
management in the majority of surveyed farms. Also the biggest portion of holdings has an 
improved access to public support, and augmented amount of subsidies for production, 
income and investment support. At the same time, the share of farms with lower total 
indebtedness comparing to the pre-accession period is 38%, while with a higher one bellow 
18%.  
   
Figure 17. Level of farms major indicators comparing to level before EU CAP implementation in 
Bulgaria 
Source: Interviews with farm managers 
 
According to the more than a half of farms they have an improved qualification and 
information, agro-techniques and crop rotation, and livestock conditions, as well as increased 
product and food safety, and innovation activity comparing to the period before CAP 
 implementation.  All that is a direct or indirect result of the favourable impact on different CAP 
mechanisms on the key aspects of the activities of majority of surveyed farms. 
However, a good fraction of farms report lack of change in share of sold output, market 
access, diversification of products and services, deepening of specialization, and in 
environmental preservation. Also a big part of farms have no changes in their dependency 
from suppliers and buyers, increased integration with suppliers and buyers, and improved 
involvement in professional organizations and access to the agricultural advisory system. 
Furthermore, a big portion of holdings do not report changes in the profitability, land 
and livestock productivity, overall indebtedness and financial independency, efficiency of 
production, management and contractual relations, competiveness, economic and social 
sustainability, agro-techniques and crop rotation, livestock conditions, product and food 
safety, introduction of innovation, qualification and information. Besides, more than a third of 
farms have no improvement in the relations with state organizations and in the access to 
public support in comparison to the pre-accession period. 
Therefore, implementation of diverse instruments of CAP does not lead to a 
progressive change in the man indicators of a good part of farms. The later is either due to 
the lack of positive effect from CAP on a portion of holdings (for example, lack of effective 
public support) or due to neutralized effect of CAP on other negative factors which could have 
deteriorated even further the state of farms (in conditions of lack of counterbalancing the 
existing negative trends CAP instruments). 
For a considerable share of farms the current level of the main indicators is lower or 
significantly lower comparing to the level before CAP introduction. For instance, 27% of 
surveyed holdings indicate deteriorated financial independence, more than 24% are with 
diminished profit, almost 17% are with reduced net income and competitiveness, around 16% 
are with inferior economic sustainability, almost 15% are with lower profitability, and 14% are 
with deteriorated social sustainability. Similarly, nearly 19% of farms are with worsened 
relations with the state organizations, above 13% of them have decreased efficiency of 
contractual relations, every tenth is with inferior livestock conditions, almost 9% of holdings 
are with decreased access to public support, and more than 8% are with reduced 
membership in professional organizations. 
All these show that CAP implementation is associated with deterioration of main 
indicators of a considerable portion of farms. This is either because of the negative effects of 
CAP on a party of farms, or due to the lack of effective mechanisms for assisting the farms 
adaptation and for compensating the influence of other negative factors (e.g. competition with 
heavily subsidized imported products at the national and international markets, high interest 
rates of bank credits, big market price fluctuations etc.). 
 
Impact of EU CAP individual components on farms sustainability 
  
According to most of experts the effect of EU direct payments and national top-ups on 
economic, social and environmental sustainability of big farms, firms, and farms specialized in 
field crops is good or significant (Figure 18). At the same time, the majority of exerts assess 
as insignificant or neutral the impact of direct payments and national top-ups on sustainability 
on the rest type of holdings. Nevertheless, almost a half of experts believe that direct 
 payments have good effect on economic, social and environmental sustainability of 
cooperatives. 
   
 
Figure 18. Impact of area-based direct payments and national top-ups on sustainability of 
Bulgarian farms 
Source: Expertise with leading national experts 
 
According to the managers of surveyed farms direct payments and national top-ups 
have got more significant positive effects on environmental sustainability only for holdings 
with natural handicaps (all farms) and in mountainous regions (75% of respondents). A half of 
supported cooperatives, and farms with mix corps and crop0livestock specialisation also 
report good or significant impact of these instruments on their environmental sustainability. 
On the other hand, all assisted with that measure Sole Traders, and holdings 
specialised in permanent crops, pigs, poultry and rabbits, and the majority of the other type of 
farms assess the impact of these instruments on their environmental sustainability as neutral 
or insignificant.  
Similarly, implementation of the individual measures of NPARD has got unequal effect 
on farms in the country. According to majority of experts impact of measures associated with 
payments for less-favoured areas in mountainous and non-mountainous regions (211 and 
212) is good  (Figure 19). What is more, most experts estimate that measures “Modernization 
of agricultural holdings” (121), “Setting up of young farmers” (112), “Village renewal and 
development” (322), and „Basic services to rural population and economies” (321) are with 
good or significant impact in relations to agricultural farms.  
On the other hand, impact of all other measures is evaluated by experts as neutral or 
insignificant. Furthermore, around a half of experts assess as neutral the effect on farms in 
the country of measures “Producer groups” (142), “Improvement of the economic value of 
forests” (122), “Semi-subsistence farming” (141), and “Implementing local development 
strategies and cooperation projects” (411/412/413/431). 
 
  
 
  
Figure 19. Impact of NPARD support measures on Bulgarian farms 
Source: Expertise with leading national experts 
 
According to the supported farm managers the NPARD measures with the greatest 
impact on their farms are: “Modernization of agricultural holdings” (121), “Setting up of young 
farmers” (112), and “Professional training, information and advisory service” (111) (Figure 
20). For instance, 54,2% of the managers of assisted farms evaluate as good the impact of 
Measure 121 on their holdings, and 12,5% report that effects of these measure in significant. 
Every 6 out 10 participants in the Measure 112, and 45% of supported with Measure 111 and 
Measure 141 assess as good the impact on their farms.  
More than a third of farms, receiving agro-environmental payments (Measure 123) also 
estimate as good the impact of that kind of support on their farm. Similarly, a good portion of 
holdings with payments for mountainous regions with natural handicaps (Measure 121) and in 
regions different from mountainous (Measure 122) assess as good (15,4% and 8,3% 
accordingly) or significant (7,7% and 8,3% accordingly) the impact of these measures on their 
farms. 
Effects of the all other measures for the majority of supported holdings is estimated as 
insignificant or nil. 
  
Figure 20. Share of Bulgarian farms evaluating as good or significant NPARD measures impact 
on their farms (percent) 
Source: Interviews with farm managers 
 
The impact of “Payments for farms in less-favoured mountainous regions” (Measure 
211) is assessed by the majority of experts as good and significant for farms of all juridical 
types, farms with middle and big size, and farms specialized in field crops, grazing livestock, 
mix crops, and mix crop-livestock. As far as the effect of support under that measure on small 
farms, and farms specialized in vegetables, fruits, pigs, poultry and rabbits, and mix livestock, 
it is estimated as insignificant or neutral by most experts.  
According to the less that a quarter of the managers of farms supported by Measure 
211, the effect of that measure on their holdings in good or significant. The strongest is the 
impact of these payments for farms with small sizes, Physical Persons, and holdings 
specialized in permanent crops and vegetables. The positive effect of that type of payment 
involves two-third of small-scale farms, every other unregistered holding and specialised in 
permanent crops, and 40% of farms specialised in vegetables. 
The official data for supported farms also indicates that most of them are small-scale 
holdings (Figure 21) as the number, area, and support to farms less than 50 ha increased for 
2007-2009 by 16%, 10% and 22% accordingly (MAF). Nevertheless, around 2% of the 
biggest farms manage more than 57 % of supported by the measure area. 
 
  
Figure 21. Distribution of beneficiaries for payments for less-favoured areas in Bulgaria (2008) 
Source: MAF, State Fund “Agriculture” 
 
As far as the effect of “Payments to farmers in areas with handicaps different from 
mountainous” (Measure 212) is concerned, it is estimated by most experts to be good or 
significant for firms and farms with big size.  For mix-crops and mix crops-livestock farms 
impact of these payments is assessed as good by most experts. According to majority of 
experts the impact of payments of that type on cooperatives, and specialized in vegetables 
farms, is insignificant. Around a half of expert evaluate as insignificant the effect of these 
payments on holdings with small size, and farms specialized in permanent crops, grazing 
livestock, pigs, poultry and rabbits, mix livestock, and filed crops. The impact of these 
payments on unregistered farms is estimated by the most experts as neutral or insignificant.  
According to the less than 17% of the managers of supported farms, the impact of the 
Measure 212 e good or significant. The positive impact of that instrument of CAP is felt only 
by holdings specialized in permanent crops and vegetables, the unregistered farms, and the 
holdings with small and middle size. 
The official data for the supported farms also shows that most of them are small scale 
holdings (Figure 21) as the number and area of supported farms less than 50 ha increased 
for 2007-2009 by 15% and 10% accordingly (MAF). Nevertheless, a little more than 2% of the 
biggest farms manage more than 60 % of supported areas under that measure.  
The impact of “Agri-environment payments” (Measure 214) on firms, farms with large 
size, and farms specialized in mix-crops is evaluated by the most experts as good. More than 
the half of experts also suggests that there is a good effect of that type of payments on 
cooperatives, and farm specialized in field crops, permanent crops, and grazing livestock. 
The impact of agri-environmental payments” on farms with middle size is estimated as 
insignificant by more than the half of experts. As far as other types of farms are concerned, 
the effect of these payments is assessed as neutral or insignificant by most experts.  
According to the two-third of the managers of supported cooperatives the effect of 
Measure 214 is good. As good is assessed the impact of these payments by the half of 
holdings with small-scale, the agri-corporations, and farms specialised in vegetables and 
permanent crops, 40% of holdings specialized in field crops, every third farms with big size 
 and crop-livestock specialisation, and less than 29% of unregistered farms and middle-sized 
holdings. 
For all other categories of supported farms the impacts of agri-environmental 
payments is insignificant or neutral, including for all Sole Traders, specialised livestock 
holdings, and farms with lands in protected zones and territories. 
 
5. Conclusion and policy recommendations 
 
Our analysis has demonstrated that suggested new framework for studying agro-
environmental management let better understand, assess and improve eco-management in 
the specific market, institutional and natural environment of individual farms, ecosystems, 
regions, sub-sectors and countries. 
We have also showed that post-communist transition and EU integration has brought 
about significant changes in agri-environmental management in Bulgaria. Newly evolved 
market, private and public governance has led to a significant improvement of eco-
management and eco-impacts of agriculture introducing modern eco-standards and public 
support, enhancing environmental stewardship, disintensifying production, recovering 
landscape and traditional productions, and diversifying quality, eco-products and services. 
Agrarian transition and integration has been also associated with some new challenges such 
as unsustainable exploitation of natural resources, lost biodiversity, land degradation, water 
and air contamination etc. 
Furthermore, implementation of the “common” EU policies has been having unlike 
results in the specific “Bulgarian” conditions. Up to date (and likely in a short and medium 
term) it enlarges income, technological, and eco-discrepancy between different farms, sub-
sectors, and regions. In a longer-term eco-hazard(s) caused by agriculture will likely expand 
unless effective public and private measures are taken to mitigate existing eco-problems and 
risks. Moreover, the specific structures for management of farming activity (small commercial, 
semi-market, and subsistence farms, production cooperatives, large business firms) will 
continue to dominate in years to come and have to incorporate the eco-management needs. 
Therefore, a significant improvement of public (Government, EU) interventions in 
agrarian and eco-management is needed to enhance sustainability of prospective farms and 
sustainable agrarian and rural development. Implementation of the EU common (agricultural, 
environmental, regional etc.) policies would have no desired impacts on environmental 
conservation and improvement unless special measures are taken to improve eco-information 
and assessments; modernize the system of property rights, public regulations and 
enforcement; perfect management of public organisations, programs and services; and 
extend public support to and partnerships with dominating farming (including small-scale and 
subsistence) structures etc. 
We have identified a number major problems, challenges and risks in eco-
management of Bulgarian agriculture at the current state of development including: the lack of 
appropriate information and assessments on eco-pressures, states, impacts and risks 
available for all farmers and other agents related with natural environment; ineffective system 
of formal property rights (rules) and public enforcement of laws, contracts and official 
standards; farmland degradation (exhaustion, erosion, contamination, compression); 
ineffective water utilisation and waters contamination; air pollution; adverse effect on natural 
biodiversity; poor waste management (burning fields, illegal garbage dumping and yards, 
 ineffective storing and disposal of old chemicals); not-motivated, incapable and/or 
unsustainable farming structures; lack of effective eco-organisations able to mitigate existing 
and emerging eco-conflicts and risks; lack of sufficient eco-education in farmers and other 
stakeholders; lack of effective system of eco-innovations; ineffective forms of public 
involvement such as inadequate, under or over-intervention, gaps in planning, coordination 
and regulations, high controversy, unpredictability and costs, insufficient capability and 
funding, large-scale mismanagement, lack of participation of and partnership with other 
stakeholders etc. 
Therefore, further improvement of institutional environment, public policies and modes 
of public intervention is necessary to modernize the system of eco-management in 
agriculture. More particularly public policy attention is to be directed to: 
First, better integration of environmental (including neglected eco-system services, 
ground water etc.) policy in agrarian and development policies as effective design and 
enforcement of long-term eco-measures get a high priority. Up to date most public efforts 
have been put on addressing urgent socio-economic (e.g. financial) problems while 
improvement of eco-management is perceived as unimportant. Accordingly, no measures are 
taken to mitigate or prevent various eco-risks (e.g. impacts of climate change, constant 
practicing of monoculture, re-intensification etc.). Furthermore, it is to be stability and certainty 
in eco-policy (long-term public commitment rather than frequent changes) in order to induce 
effective private and collective actions. For instance, a major reason for low investments in 
otherwise efficient agricultural green energy (energy crops; manure, biomass and wind 
energy production) has been the big uncertainty about the long-term policy in the area.   
Second, complete application of integral approach of soil, water and biodiversity 
management in planning, funding, management, monitoring, controlling and assessment at all 
levels with stakeholders’ involvement in decision-making. Moreover, eco-system services, 
life-cycle, eco-, energy and water accounts and footprints, and other modern approaches are 
to be incorporated into program design and management at all levels. 
Third, improving coordination and efficiency of actions of various public and private 
agents involved in eco-management. Individual elements and responsibilities in public eco-
management are usually divided between various agents and organisations with poor 
coordination, conflicting interests, and inconsistency, controversies, gaps and inefficiency of 
actions. 
Forth, better defining, regulating and further privatizing (collectivizing) property, user, 
management, trading, discharge etc. rights and assets related to eco-resources, eco-system 
services, renewable energy supply, (N, GHG) emissions, waste discharges etc.  
Five, employing a greater range of economic instruments including appropriate pricing, 
quotas, public funding and insurance, taxing, interlinking etc. to improve eco-resources use 
efficiency and risk-sharing, prevent over-intensification and pressure on natural resources, 
and support farms adaptation to changing market, institutional and natural environment. 
Six, organizationally and financially securing adequate eco-data collection, monitoring, 
and independent assessment, including agricultural linkages with the state of environment: 
soil, water and air contamination; impacts on biodiversity; waste production and 
decomposition; total social costs, energy intensity, eco- (water) foot-print, benefits from 
farming; effect on eco-conservation and improvement; renewable energy production; impacts 
of climate change; existing and likely risks etc. What is more, adequate mechanisms to 
 assure timely disclosure and effective communication of available information to decision-
makers, stakeholders and public at large are to be put in place. 
Seven, better adapting EU CAP and national instruments to the specific Bulgarian 
conditions through greater support to farm modernization and adaptation, eco-innovations, 
and prospective business and non-for profit modes; relaxing the EU criteria for semi-market 
and young farmers; directing funds to prospective (Farm modernization and adaptation, 
Young farmers, environmental), and unsupported (Organic livestock, restoration of 
abandoned farmland) measures and organizations (livestock, public academic centres); and 
better implementing planed eco- measures. 
Nine, improving eco-education and training of farmers, administrators, other 
stakeholders and public at large through modernization of agrarian education and Agricultural 
Education and Advisory Service. The later are to reach all agents via effective methods of 
education, advice, and information (TV, radio, on line information; demonstration) suited to 
their specific needs; set up a system of continues training and sharing experiences; include 
eco-, water, waste management, climate change and rural development issues; cooperate 
with other (public and private) academic institutions and private organizations; involve farmers 
and stakeholders in programs management, implementation and assessment at all levels. 
Eight, employing more hybrid (public-private, public-collective) modes given their 
coordination, incentives, and control advantages. Public organization and enforcement of 
most eco-standards is very difficult (especially in huge informal sectors and remote areas). 
Public support to voluntary initiatives of professional, community and non-governmental 
organizations (informing, training, assisting, funding, risk-sharing), and assistance in 
cooperation at grass-root, eco-system, watershed, trans-regional, trans-border levels is much 
more efficient. Accordingly, real participation of farmers and stakeholders in priority setting, 
management, and assessment of public programs and regulations at all levels is to be 
institutionalized. 
Ten, improving the overall institutional environment and public governance perfecting 
property rights protection, laws and contracts enforcement, combating against 
mismanagement and corruption in public sector, removing restrictions for market, private and 
collective initiatives etc. 
Eleven, giving more public support to multidisciplinary and interdisciplinary research on 
all aspects and impacts of eco-management, including factors and forms of eco-
management, and their impact on individual and collective eco-behaviour and environmental 
preservation. Up to date efforts of Ecologists, Technologists, Economists, Law, Sociologists, 
Behavioural and Political Scientists have been rarely united; most studies focus on individual 
aspect(s) of sustainability, or certain form(s) of management, or management level, or 
geographical location. What is more, the governance of farming is usually separated from the 
management of households and rural activities; and “normative” (to some “ideal” or “model in 
a foreign country”) rather than comparative (between feasible alternatives) approach is 
broadly employed; and significant social (third-party, recovery, transaction etc.) costs largely 
ignored. Consequently, institutional, behavioural, economic, ecological, international etc. 
factors of environmental sustainability are not properly understood, spectrum of feasible 
management modes properly identified, and efficiency, complementarities, and prospects of 
development adequately assessed.  
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